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VACATING AWARDS UNDER THE
WISCONSIN ARBITRATION ACT AND THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
RALPH ANZIVINO*
Arbitration has become one of the primary means for parties to
resolve their legal disputes. Unlike a court proceeding, however, the
grounds for vacating an arbitration award are quite narrow and specific.
The purpose of this Article is to identify and explain the five major ways
to vacate an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act and the
Wisconsin Arbitration Act. The first way is to challenge whether the
parties contractually agreed to arbitrate the dispute. The specific
challenge is to the scope of the contract or the scope of the arbitration
clause in the contract. The second is to show that the other party was
involved in some type of conduct involving corruption, fraud, or undue
means that impacted the arbitration award. The third is to prove that the
arbitrator was evidently partial and, thus, a fair and impartial arbitrator
did not decide the award. The fourth is to establish that the arbitrator
committed some type of administrative misconduct in conducting the
arbitration. Finally, the fifth is to prove that the arbitrator misused his
power and, thereby, exceeded his authority. Each of the grounds is
analyzed in detail, with case examples to enhance one’s understanding.
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INTRODUCTION

Arbitration has become one of the mainstays for resolving legal
disputes. Virtually every type of dispute and every area of the law lends
itself to resolution by arbitration. In addition, it is not necessary that an
attorney be a litigator in order to competently participate in arbitration.
There are no rules of evidence, there are no juries, discovery is often
very limited, the hearing is private, and attorneys are generally given a
very wide berth in presenting their case to the arbitrator. As a result,
most attorneys, including ones who consider themselves to be
transactional lawyers, will be involved in some type of arbitration.
The primary arbitration statute under federal law is the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA),1 and in Wisconsin it is the Wisconsin
Arbitration Act (WAA).2 The statutes are virtually identical, so cases
decided under one statute are persuasive authority for the other in the
absence of a conflicting precedent.3 The FAA or the WAA will govern
virtually every arbitration conducted in Wisconsin, unless the parties’
contract states otherwise.4 For example, any contract that provides
“Wisconsin law shall control” or similar language will be arbitrated
under the WAA.5
Unfortunately, there may be occasions when the attorney and client
believe the arbitrator’s award should be vacated. Unlike an appeal of a
court decision, where the appellate courts are free to view the
application of the law to the facts in a different way than the lower
court, the review of an arbitrator’s award by a reviewing court is
significantly different. The purpose of this Article is to identify and
explain the various ways that an attorney can seek to have an
arbitrator’s award vacated before it is confirmed by a court. A
subsequent article will address the issue of seeking relief from the
arbitrator’s award once it has become a judgment by court confirmation.
There are five primary ways to get an arbitrator’s award vacated.
The first is to challenge whether the parties ever agreed to arbitrate a
matter. This typically involves either challenging the existence or
validity of a contract to arbitrate, or the scope of the arbitration clause,

1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
2. See WIS. STAT. §§ 788.01–.18 (2013–2014).
3. Marlowe v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 2012 WI App 51, ¶ 9, 340 Wis. 2d 594, 811
N.W.2d 894; Steichen v. Hensler, 2005 WI App 117, ¶ 14, 283 Wis. 2d 755, 701 N.W.2d 1.
4. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; WIS. STAT. § 788.01.
5. WIS. STAT. § 788.01.
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if there is a contract between the parties. This is called substantive
arbitrability. The second is to show that the other party was involved in
some type of conduct involving corruption, fraud, or undue means that
impacted the arbitration award. The third is to prove that the arbitrator
was evidently partial and, thus, a fair and impartial arbitrator did not
decide the award. The fourth is to establish that the arbitrator
committed some type of administrative misconduct in conducting the
arbitration. Examples would be failing to admit evidence or denying an
adjournment request. Finally, the last ground is to prove that the
arbitrator misused his power and thereby exceeded his authority. An
arbitrator misuses his power by perversely misconstruing his authority,
manifestly disregarding the law, or issuing an award that is against
public policy.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
As a basic proposition, Wisconsin courts take “a ‘hands off’
approach to arbitration awards.”6 The primary function of a reviewing
court is to assure the parties that they received the arbitration they
agreed to in their contract.7 The general rule followed by the courts is
not to overturn an arbitrator’s award even if there has been serious
error.8 It is not a sufficient ground to vacate an award simply because
the arbitrator’s decision is wrong or based on an error of law or fact.9
Rather, there must be extraordinary circumstances to vacate an award.10
In addition, any ground to vacate an award must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.11 Finally, absent fraud, a party unhappy with an
arbitration award cannot seek discovery from an arbitrator to secure

6. Grambow v. Associated Dental Servs., Inc., No. 94-1735, 1996 WL 5638, at *2, 199
Wis. 2d 522, 546 N.W.2d 578 (Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1996) (per curiam, unpublished table decision)
(quoting City of Madison v. Madison Prof’l Police Officers Ass’n, 144 Wis. 2d 576, 587, 425
N.W.2d 8, 12 (1988)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
7. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. Dist. Council 48, No. 85-0821, 1985 Wisc. App.
LEXIS 3957, at *4, 128 Wis. 2d 556, 381 N.W.2d 621 (Dec. 4, 1985) (unpublished table
decision).
8. Greendale Educ. Ass’n v. Greendale Sch. Dist., No. 01-3234, 2002 WL 31455693, ¶ 8,
2003 WI App 1, 259 Wis. 2d 481, 655 N.W.2d 546 (Nov. 5, 2002) (per curiam, unpublished
table decision).
9. Id. ¶ 12.
10. Id. ¶ 9.
11. DeBaker v. Shah, 194 Wis. 2d 104, 117, 533 N.W.2d 464, 468 (1995).
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evidence in the hope of vacating the arbitrator’s award.12 As a further
indication of limited judicial review of arbitration awards, Wisconsin has
adopted the Steelworkers Trilogy when addressing labor contract
disputes.13
Courts “will not relitigate issues submitted to arbitration.”14 When
reviewing an arbitrator’s award, a court is not entitled to consider new
evidence on the merits of the award.15 Further, even newly discovered
evidence is not a sufficient ground to re-litigate the dispute.16
Courts have concluded that “arbitration is not litigation.”17
However, when reviewing an arbitrator’s award, the doctrines of res
judicata18 and collateral estoppel19 have been applied to arbitrations.20
One court noted that a prior fact-finding arbitration is res judicata on a
subsequent arbitration between the same parties.21 Those doctrines,
however, will not be considered if the arbitrator’s award goes beyond
the submission of the contract.22 Similarly, the doctrines of claim23 and

12. Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 2008 WI App 116, ¶ 19, 313 Wis. 2d
93, 756 N.W.2d 461.
13. Denhart v. Waukesha Brewing Co., 17 Wis. 2d 44, 51–52, 115 N.W.2d 490, 494
(1962); see also City of Madison v. AFSCME, 124 Wis. 2d 298, 302, 369 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Ct.
App. 1985).
14. McLaughlin v. Hoffman, No. 2009AP624, 2010 WL 347908, ¶ 8, 2010 WI App 46,
324 Wis. 2d 306, 784 N.W.2d 183 (Feb. 2, 2010) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
15. Barnard v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., No. 88-0600, 1988 WL 148354, at *3, 148 Wis. 2d
948, 437 N.W.2d 235 (Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1988) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
16. Id.
17. Badger Contracting, Inc. v. Harwood, No. 99-0824, 2000 WL 486262, ¶ 7, 2000 WI
App 116, 235 Wis. 2d 275, 616 N.W.2d 524 (Apr. 26, 2000) (unpublished table decision).
18.
An affirmative defense barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on
the same claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of
transactions and that could have been—but was not—raised in the first suit. . . .
The three essential elements are (1) an earlier decision on the issue, (2) a final
judgment on the merits, and (3) the involvement of the same parties, or parties in
privity with the original parties.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1504 (10th ed. 2014) [hereinafter BLACK’S] (res judicata).
19. “A doctrine barring a party from relitigating an issue determined against that party
in an earlier action, even if the second action differs significantly from the first one.” Id. at
318 (collateral estoppel).
20. Manu-Tronics, Inc. v. Effective Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 163 Wis. 2d 304, 311, 471 N.W.2d
263, 266 (Ct. App. 1991).
21. Local 366 v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., No. 82-1739, 1983 WL 161544, at *2,
114 Wis. 2d 595, 338 N.W.2d 527 (Ct. App. July 11, 1983) (unpublished table decision).
22. Id. at *3.
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issue preclusion24 are applicable to successive arbitration decisions, the
same as successive litigation, because the policies underlying
arbitration—of a speedy, final decision—support the application of
these doctrines.25 Finally, the doctrine of judicial estoppel26 has also
been applied in an arbitration setting. Where a party to arbitration
claimed that an arbitration clause was unconscionable, the court applied
the doctrine of judicial estoppel because it was that party who invoked
the arbitration clause in the first place.27
III. SUBSTANTIVE ARBITRABILITY
Substantive arbitrability is the first issue considered by the courts
when deciding whether to vacate an arbitrator’s award.28 There are two
issues that comprise substantive arbitrability. The first issue is whether
the parties have consented to arbitration through a written agreement.29
Interestingly, the statute does not provide for enforcement of an oral
agreement to arbitrate but rather only a written one.30 The second issue

23. The rule of claim preclusion is that any claims that were brought or could have been
brought in an earlier litigation between the parties must be brought in the first action or be
barred. 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4406, at 138 (2d ed. 2002).
24. The rule of issue preclusion is that “a right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue
and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot
be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies.” Id. § 4416, at 387
(quoting S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48 (1897)).
25. Dane Cnty. v. Dane Cnty. Union Local 65, 210 Wis. 2d 267, 279, 565 N.W.2d 540,
545 (Ct. App. 1997). The minimum requirements for application of the preclusion doctrines
are that “the claim, or the issue . . . decided in the first arbitration is the same” issue or claim
in the second arbitration, “the parties are the same, the parties have had a full opportunity to
argue their respective positions,” and “the parties have not agreed to re-submit the claim or
the issue . . . to a second arbitration.” Id. at 280.
26. “Estoppel that prevents a party from contradicting previous declarations made
during the same or an earlier proceeding if the change in position would adversely affect the
proceeding or constitute a fraud on the court.” BLACK’S, supra note 18, at 668 (judicial
estoppel).
27. Pegues v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 2008AP1500, 2009 WL 454672, ¶ 18, 2009 WI
App 41, 316 Wis. 2d 774, 766 N.W.2d 242 (Feb. 25, 2009) (per curiam, unpublished table
decision).
28. Tri-Cnty. Invs., LLC v. Toney Law Offices, S.C., No. 2007AP195, 2008 WL 426233,
¶ 12, 2008 WI App 51, 309 Wis. 2d 234, 747 N.W.2d 527 (Feb. 19, 2008) (per curiam,
unpublished table decision).
29. Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, LLP v. Bosben, No. 2011AP1862, 2013 WL 627247,
¶ 7, 2013 WI App 41, 346 Wis. 2d 730, 828 N.W.2d 592 (Feb. 21, 2013) (per curiam,
unpublished table decision).
30. See WIS. STAT. §§ 788.02–.03 (2013–2014).
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is, if they have such an agreement, whether the subject matter of the
dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement or clause.31
The test utilized by the courts in making such a determination is
whether the court can “determine with reasonable certainty that there
was a ‘common intent’ to submit that particular issue to arbitration.”32
Essentially, the court must determine whether the arbitrator’s analysis
came from the essence of the contract.33
The parties in their written agreement can refer issues of
arbitrability to the arbitrator, but the courts require a “clear
demonstration of that purpose.”34 As a general rule, the courts indicate
that an arbitrator should not “be the judge of the scope of his . . .
authority . . . unless” the parties’ contract “clearly and unmistakably
grant[s] the arbitrator such authority.”35 In the event that the
arbitrability issue is submitted to the arbitrator, the court will not
overturn the arbitrator’s decision on arbitrability unless it can be said
with “positive assurance” that the language defining the arbitral issue is
not susceptible to the arbitrator’s interpretation.36 Further, the courts
will “resolve any doubts in favor of coverage.”37 In other words, if the
parties’ written contract does not expressly provide that the arbitrator
can decide issues of arbitrability, any arbitrator decision on arbitrability
is subject to judicial de novo review without any deference to the

31. Id.; Superior Cranberry Creek Landfill Negotiating Comm. v. State Waste Facility
Siting Bd., No. 2003AP3167, 2005 WL 1981272, ¶ 7, 2005 WI App 214, 287 Wis. 2d 506, 704
N.W.2d 423 (Aug. 18, 2005) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
32. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. City of Milwaukee, No. 99-2069, 2000 WL 705353,
¶ 9, 200 WI App 161, 238 Wis. 2d 94, 617 N.W.2d 677 (June 1, 2000) (unpublished table
decision) (quoting Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 202
Wis. 2d 673, 681, 552 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Ct. App. 1996)).
33. Id. ¶ 9.
34. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Jefferson Educ. Ass’n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 102, 253 N.W.2d 536,
540–41 (1977) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 583 n.7 (1960)); Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2011 WI App 14,
¶ 11, 331 Wis. 2d 188, 795 N.W.2d 777.
35. Hudec Law Offices, S.C. v. Esser, 2003 WL 22998535, ¶ 8, 2004 WI App 21, 269 Wis.
2d 543, 674 N.W.2d 681 (Dec. 23, 2003) (per curiam, unpublished table decision) (citing
AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
36. Cirilli v. Country Ins. & Fin. Servs., 2009 WI App 167, ¶ 14, 322 Wis. 2d 238, 776
N.W.2d 272 (quoting AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650); Superior Cranberry, 2005 WL 1981272,
¶ 7 (quoting Madison Landfills, Inc. v. Libby Landfill Negotiating Comm., 188 Wis. 2d 613,
634, 524 N.W.2d 883, 892 (1994)).
37. Superior Cranberry, 2005 WL 1981272, ¶ 7 (quoting Madison Landfills, Inc., 188
Wis. 2d at 634).
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arbitrator’s decision.38 On the other hand, if the parties’ written
agreement does provide that the arbitrator can decide issues of
arbitrability, then the arbitrator’s decision will be granted the normal
deference.39
There is no procedure defined in the statutes or prescribed by the
courts for raising the issue of substantive arbitrability.40 As a practical
matter, the issue will be raised depending upon whether a party has
initiated court litigation. If litigation has already been initiated, upon
application of one of the parties, the court shall stay the trial of the
action until arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.41 Before referring the matter to arbitration, the court must
be satisfied that the issue involved in the suit or proceeding is properly
referred to arbitration under the parties’ agreement.42 Therefore, prior
to referral, the court will necessarily decide substantive arbitrability.
In the event that litigation in court has not been initiated between
the parties, the party opposing arbitration has several choices available
on how to raise the issue of substantive arbitrability. First, the party
opposing arbitration can simply refuse to participate in the arbitration.43
Second, the opposing party could seek an injunction against the
arbitration.44 And third, the party opposing arbitration could decide to
submit to the arbitration while preserving the objection to substantive
arbitrability for subsequent de novo judicial review.45
The best choice is simply to refuse to participate in the arbitration.
By refusing to participate in the arbitration process, the refusing party
thereby forces the moving party to seek a court order to arbitrate.46 The
exclusive remedy for a party’s refusal to arbitrate is to compel
arbitration through a court order, and the failure to do so constitutes a
waiver of substantive arbitrability should the moving party choose to

38. Madison Teachers Inc. v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 2004 WI App 54, ¶ 10, 271
Wis. 2d 697, 678 N.W.2d 311.
39. Id.
40. Scholl v. Lundberg, 178 Wis. 2d 259, 264, 504 N.W.2d 115, 117 (Ct. App. 1993).
41. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 788.02 (2013–2014).
42. 9 U.S.C. § 3; WIS. STAT. § 788.02.
43. Scholl, 178 Wis. 2d at 264–65.
44. Id. at 264.
45. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Jefferson Educ. Ass’n, 78 Wis. 2d 94, 106–07, 253 N.W.2d
536, 542–43 (1977).
46. 9 U.S.C. § 4; WIS. STAT. § 788.03.
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proceed without complying with the statute.47 As part of the process to
compel arbitration, “[t]he court shall hear the parties, and upon being
satisfied that” substantive arbitrability is not an issue “shall make an
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration.”48 Seeking an
injunction would place the burden of proof on the moving party and is
also contrary to the exclusive remedy provided for a party’s refusal to
arbitrate. Finally, the third choice is needlessly wasteful in that the
court does not finally resolve the substantive arbitrability issue until the
arbitration process is completed.
A cautionary note is that partial participation in the arbitration
process without a reservation of rights can be deemed a waiver of the
substantive arbitrability issue.49 Courts have held that where one party
participates in preliminary arbitration procedures in preparation for a
hearing on the merits, that party is indicating to the other that it intends
to fully participate in the process and thereby waives the substantive
arbitrability issue.50 Where a party raised the issue of substantive
arbitrability three and one-half months after the petition was filed
compelling arbitration, and after having participated in the arbitrator
selection process, the court held the party was estopped from raising the
substantive arbitrability issue.51
Also, a challenge to substantive arbitrability must be made to the
arbitrator, or it will be waived.52 Where a party challenged an
arbitrator’s award in court on the basis that the opposing party failed to
produce a written contract whereby the parties agreed to arbitrate the
dispute, but failed to raise that issue before the arbitrator, the court held
the substantive arbitrability issue was waived.53 Similarly, where a party
sought attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest as part of an arbitration

47. State ex rel. Carl v. Charles, 71 Wis. 2d 85, 90, 237 N.W.2d 29, 31 (1976).
48. 9 U.S.C. § 4; WIS. STAT. § 788.03.
49. Pilgrim Inv. Corp. v. Reed, 156 Wis. 2d 677, 685, 457 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Ct. App.
1990).
50. Id. at 685–86.
51. Id. at 686–87.
52. MBNA Am. Bank v. Gilbertson, No. 2004AP1071, 2005 WL 1119749, ¶ 13, 2005 WI
App 126, 284 Wis. 2d 569, 699 N.W.2d 252 (May 11, 2005) (per curiam, unpublished table
decision) (citing DePue v. Mastermold, Inc., 161 Wis. 2d 697, 703–04, 468 N.W.2d 750, 752
(Ct. App. 1991)).
53. MBNA Am. Bank, 2005 WL 1119749, ¶ 13.
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award, the court held that those issues were waived since they were not
brought before the arbitrator who granted the award.54
Finally, an arbitrator does not have “the power to consolidate claims
[that arise] under separate arbitration contracts absent an agreement to
do so, even if consolidation” would resolve the claims more efficiently.55
An arbitrator, however, can order consolidation of claims through an
implicit agreement if the way the parties framed the issues evidenced an
agreement to consolidate the claims.56
IV. CORRUPTION, FRAUD, OR UNDUE MEANS
A court will vacate an arbitrator’s award if it “was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means.”57 There are essentially three
requirements that must be satisfied in order to have an award vacated
on the basis of corruption, fraud, or undue means. First, the aggrieved
party must establish the improper conduct.58 Second, there must be a
nexus between the improper conduct and the arbitrator’s award.59 And
third, the aggrieved party must prove that the improper conduct was not
discoverable prior to the award.60
The first requirement is to fit the alleged improper conduct into the
appropriate statutory category. Corruption is not defined in the statute
or case law. Fraud, on the other hand, is a well-traveled road and
understood to be a “knowing misrepresentation or concealment of a
material fact to induce another to act to his . . . detriment.”61 A simple
example would be obtaining an arbitration award as a result of perjured

54. Badger Contracting, Inc. v. Harwood, No. 99-0824, 2000 WL 486262, ¶¶ 2, 8, 2000
WI App 116, 235 Wis. 2d 275, 616 N.W.2d 524 (Apr. 26, 2000) (unpublished table decision).
55. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 202 Wis. 2d 673,
683, 552 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1996).
56. Id. at 684.
57. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2012); WIS. STAT. § 788.10(1)(a) (2013–2014).
58. Pegues v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 2008AP1500, 2009 WL 454672, ¶ 11, 2009 WI
App 41, 316 Wis. 2d 774, 766 N.W.2d 242 (Feb. 25, 2009) (per curiam, unpublished table
decision).
59. Id. ¶ 15.
60. Pegues, 2009 WL 454672, ¶¶ 15–16; Steichen v. Hensler, 2005 WI App 117, ¶¶ 14–
15, 283 Wis. 2d 755, 701 N.W.2d 1; Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104,
109 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff’d, 653 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1981).
61. BLACK’S, supra note 18, at 775.
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testimony.62 Conflicting affidavits by the same person, however, do not
establish fraud but simply a conflict in testimony.63
Undue means is understood to be “an attempt to influence the
arbitrators through inappropriate, unjustified or improper methods.”64
“[I]t clearly connotes behavior that is immoral if not illegal.”65 “[M]ere
sloppy or overzealous lawyering,” however, does not constitute “undue
means.”66 Since the term follows corruption and fraud, courts indicate
that it “should be known by the company it keeps.”67 As such, it is
understood to mean “underhanded or conniving ways of procuring an
award.”68 Bad faith is required.69 An intentional malfeasance would be
another fair description.70 Where evidence was admitted during an
arbitration of a party’s arrest record, despite a state statute barring such
evidence, such conduct did not qualify as undue means.71
The second requirement is that there must be a nexus between the
improper conduct and the arbitrator’s award.72 The basis of the nexus
requirement is that the statute provides for vacatur only where the
award is procured by improper means.73 As such, the courts have read
this language to require a nexus between the improper conduct and the
award.74 The nexus, however, does not require that the aggrieved party
establish that the award would have been different had the improper
conduct not occurred.75 But, there must be some nexus between the
improper conduct and the award. Where an arbitrator premised his
62. Hood v. Laskaris, No. 84-1293, 1985 WL 188257, at *3, 126 Wis. 2d 510, 375 N.W.2d
219 (Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1985) (per curiam, unpublished table decision) (citing Dogherra v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982)).
63. Hood, 1985 WL 188257, at *3.
64. Pegues, 2009 WL 454672, ¶ 15.
65. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1992).
66. Id.
67. Nat’l Cas. Co. v. First State Ins. Grp., 430 F.3d 492, 499 (1st Cir. 2005).
68. Id.
69. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 108 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff’d,
653 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1981).
70. Id.
71. Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 52 F.3d 359, 361–62 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
72. Pegues v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 2008AP1500, 2009 WL 454672, ¶ 15, 2009 WI
App 41, 316 Wis. 2d 774, 766 N.W.2d 242 (Feb. 25, 2009) (per curiam, unpublished table
decision).
73. Forsythe Int’l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Tex., 915 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990).
74. Id.
75. Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1988).
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award on grounds clearly independent of issues related to the fraud,
there was no nexus between the fraud and the award.76 Similarly, where
an expert witness perjured himself as to his credentials but the witness’s
testimony concerned only relatively minor issues in the arbitration, the
fraud was not sufficient to vacate the arbitrator’s award.77
Finally, the aggrieved party must prove that the improper conduct
was not discoverable prior to the award.78 Where a party moved to
vacate an arbitration award on the basis of fraud but during the
arbitration stated that he suspected that the opposing party had falsified
documents, the court concluded that the fraud was discoverable by due
diligence prior to the issuance of the award and thereby vitiated the
basis of his motion.79 Similarly, where evidence was improperly
destroyed prior to the arbitration and the aggrieved party was aware of
the improper destruction, the aggrieved party was unable to use that
improper conduct as a ground for vacatur because it was well known to
all parties involved prior to the arbitration.80
V. EVIDENT PARTIALITY
An arbitration award will be vacated where there is evidence of
evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrator.81 The
policy behind vacating an arbitration award where the arbitrator has
been evidently partial is to protect “fundamental fairness.”82 The parties
to the process must believe that a disinterested arbitrator will make the
award.83

76. Id.
77. Peabody v. Rotan Mosle, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1135, 1137–38 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
78. Id. at 1138; Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 109 (N.D. Ill.
1980), aff’d, 653 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1981).
79. Lafarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334,
1339 (9th Cir. 1986).
80. Pegues v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 2008AP1500, 2009 WL 454672, ¶ 16, 2009 WI
App 41, 316 Wis. 2d 774, 766 N.W.2d 242 (Feb. 25, 2009) (per curiam, unpublished table
decision).
81. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)(2012); WIS. STAT. § 788.10(1)(b) (2013–2014).
82. Diversified Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Slotten, 119 Wis. 2d 441, 446, 351 N.W.2d 176, 179
(Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Catz Am. Co. v. Pearl Grange Fruit Exch., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 549,
552 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)) (internal quotation mark omitted), quoted in Tri-Cnty. Invs., LLC v.
Toney Law Offices, S.C., No. 2007AP195, 2008 WL 426233, ¶ 24, 2008 WI App 51, 309 Wis.
2d 234, 747 N.W.2d 527 (Feb. 19, 2008) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
83. Richco Structures v. Parkside Vill., Inc., 82 Wis. 2d 547, 557, 263 N.W.2d 204, 210
(1978).

1644

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:1633

Whether an arbitrator has exhibited evident partiality is a question
of law to be determined de novo by the court.84 The required burden of
proof standard is by clear and convincing evidence.85
The definition of evident partiality is not simply proof that an
arbitrator has an interest in the outcome of the proceeding or “proof
that a relationship exists between the arbitrator and a party or a party’s
representative which is so substantial that the arbitrator’s . . . [partiality]
may be inferred.”86 The definition is more nuanced.
“‘[E]vident partiality’ exists . . . when a reasonable person knowing
the previously undisclosed information would have . . . doubts regarding
the impartiality of the arbitrator . . . .”87 One court has noted that the
doubt must be a serious doubt about the arbitrator’s partiality.88 “[T]he
standard is not simply that a reasonable person, upon learning of the
undisclosed information, would have investigated further.”89 Rather,
the standard is whether a reasonable person, after further investigation,
would have concluded that partiality is likely.90 One court has best
captured the meaning by noting that the phrase “evident partiality”
should be “broadly construed to mean ‘evidence of possible partiality,’
rather than narrowly construed to mean ‘partiality is self evident.’”91
A neutral arbitrator “must disclose at the outset” of the arbitration
any relationship or transaction that the arbitrator “has had with the
parties or with the representatives of the parties to the arbitration
proceeding.”92 Also, “the neutral arbitrator must disclose any facts
which might indicate to a reasonable person that the arbitrator . . . might
. . . have an interest in the outcome of the arbitration.93 Finally, the
neutral arbitrator must disclose any fact or information, which might
reasonably support “the appearance of the existence of any bias,

84. DeBaker v. Shah, 194 Wis. 2d 104, 112, 533 N.W.2d 464, 466 (1995).
85. Id. at 117.
86. Richco Structures, 82 Wis. 2d at 557–58.
87. DeBaker, 194 Wis. 2d at 116–17 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
88. Borst v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WI 70, ¶ 3, 291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42.
89. DeBaker, 194 Wis. 2d at 116–17.
90. Id.
91. Sch. Dist. of Spooner v. Nw. United Educators, 136 Wis. 2d 263, 271, 401 N.W.2d
578, 582 (1987).
92. Richco Structures v. Parkside Vill., Inc., 82 Wis. 2d 547, 558, 263 N.W.2d 204, 211
(1978).
93. Id.
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prejudice, partiality, or the absence of impartiality.”94 The arbitrator’s
failure to disclose any of these facts or relationships is proof of evident
partiality.95 Even matters that are in the public record must be
disclosed.96
Full disclosure, however, is not a declaration of impartiality.97
Rather, the purpose of full disclosure is to minimize and hopefully
eliminate litigation whereby the court is asked to determine whether the
relationship or information is insignificant and inconsequential, or
whether it is substantial.98 It is much better to get these issues resolved
on the front end rather than the back end of the arbitration. Wisconsin
clearly adopts a preference for pre–arbitration challenges.99 Once full
disclosures are made, “a party may seek the removal of a challenged
arbitrator under the general equity powers of the . . . court.”100 The
court, thereby, may order the selection of another arbitrator “if the
court determines the challenged arbitrator demonstrates ‘evident
partiality.’”101
Finally, it is preferable to let the parties “gauge the arbitrator’s . . .
predilection” for partiality, rather than the courts.102 A party’s “failure
to . . . object based on the information disclosed prior to the arbitration”
will likely “act as a forfeiture of any subsequent post-arbitration
challenge [based] on the disclosed information.”103
VI. ARBITRATOR MISCONDUCT
An arbitration award will be vacated if the arbitrator is guilty of
misconduct in conducting the hearing, including refusing to postpone
the hearing without good cause, refusing to hear pertinent and material
evidence, or any other behavior that may have prejudiced a party’s
rights.104 Stated more succinctly, arbitrator misconduct occurs when an
arbitrator fails to exercise reasonable discretion when conducting the
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 559.
DeBaker v. Shah, 194 Wis. 2d 104, 119, 533 N.W.2d 464, 469 (1995).
Borst v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WI 70, ¶ 3, 291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42.
Richco Structures, 82 Wis. 2d at 560.
Borst, 2006 WI 70, ¶ 35.
Id.
Id.
Richco Structures, 82 Wis. 2d at 560–61.
Borst, 2006 WI 70, ¶ 36.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2012); WIS. STAT. 788.10(1)(c) (2013–2014).
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arbitration. Allegations of arbitrator misconduct take many forms. For
example, allegations of arbitrator misconduct have included the failure
to record the hearing,105 the failure to grant an adjournment,106 the
failure to produce a reasoned award,107 the refusal to admit evidence,108
ex parte contact by the arbitrator,109 the lack of legal analysis in an
award,110 the refusal to view a construction site,111 the refusal to stay a
hearing, and the failure to swear in a witness.112 Every allegation of
arbitrator misconduct must be brought before the arbitrator, or it will be
deemed waived by the courts.113
Mistakes of judgment of either facts or law are generally not grounds
for vacating an award.114 The complaining party must investigate the
misconduct and present some evidence to support the claim.115 In order
to establish arbitrator misconduct, it is necessary to have a record of the
arbitration proceeding.116 As a general rule, however, if there is no
requirement in the contract, the arbitrator is not required to record the
hearing.117 In the event there is no hearing transcript, the court will
presume the presence of every fact necessary to support the arbitrator’s

105. Hayett v. Kemper Sec., Inc., No. 96-2424, 1997 WL 768921, at *2, 216 Wis. 2d 113,
573 N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1997) (unpublished table decision).
106. Tri-Cnty. Invs., LLC v. Toney Law Offices, S.C., No. 2007AP195, 2008 WL 426233,
¶ 9, 2008 WI App 51, 309 Wis. 2d 234, 747 N.W.2d 527 (Feb. 19, 2008) (per curiam,
unpublished table decision).
107. Navarro v. Lake Grp., Inc., No. 91-1142, 1992 WL 70490, at *1, 167 Wis. 2d 487,
482 N.W.2d 669 (Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1992) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
108. Lake States, Inc. v. Walia, No. 99-1033, 2000 WL 1114485, ¶ 7, 2000 WI App 214,
238 Wis. 2d 841, 618 N.W.2d 273 (Aug. 1, 2000) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
109. Navarro, 1992 WL 70490, at *1.
110. Breen v. Winkel, No. 95-2677, 1996 WL 252962, at *4, 202 Wis. 2d 651, 551 N.W.2d
64 (Ct. App. May 14, 1996) (unpublished table decision).
111. Richco Structures v. Parkside Vill., Inc., No. 82-1069, 1983 WL 161650, at *1, 113
Wis. 2d 722, 334 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. Apr. 22, 1983) (per curiam, unpublished table
decision).
112. Mattson v. Schultz, No. 95-2837, 1996 WL 208192, at *1, 201 Wis. 2d 817, 549
N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1996) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
113. Fett v. Luksetich, No. 96-0839, 1997 WL 199942, at *4, 210 Wis. 2d 497, 568 N.W.2d
321 (Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1997) (unpublished table decision).
114. Richco Structures, 1983 WL 161650, at *2.
115. Navarro v. Lake Grp., Inc., No. 91-1142, 1992 WL 70490, at *3, 167 Wis. 2d 487,
482 N.W.2d 669 (Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1992) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
116. Carey v. Ablan, No. 03-1930, 2004 WL 252010, ¶ 6, 2004 WI App 68, 271 Wis. 2d
820, 677 N.W.2d 733 (Feb. 12, 2004) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
117. Navarro, 1992 WL 70490, at *1.
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decision.118 An affidavit cannot be used as a substitute for a transcript.119
Where an arbitration was conducted under the rules of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), which required the
arbitrator to record all hearings, the failure of the arbitrator to record a
hearing was held not to be misconduct.120 Similarly, where an arbitrator
indicated to the parties that he would get a court reporter for the
hearing but failed to do so, such conduct did not amount to
misconduct.121
The form of the arbitrator’s award has also led to allegations of
misconduct. Specifically, it has been alleged that the lack of legal
analysis in an award is a basis to vacate the award.122 The courts,
however, have rejected such an argument.123 In fact, the arbitrator is not
required to produce a reasoned award unless a statute or the parties’
contract requires one.124
Arbitrators should generally be very cautious about excluding or
limiting evidence. However, an arbitrator did not commit misconduct
when the arbitrator denied the admission of evidence because the party
paid its administrative fees late and the party “failed to timely submit
. . . [the] documents . . . [the party] intended to use at the hearing.”125
Also, an arbitrator’s refusal to view an allegedly defective construction
site was not misconduct where the request was made after the close of
the hearing.126
Requests for stays and adjournments are common and difficult
issues in arbitration. This decision always involves balancing competing
118. Grutzner, S.C. v. Church, No. 94-3128-FT, 1995 WL 109129, at *1, 192 Wis. 2d 767,
532 N.W.2d 471 (Ct. App. Mar. 16, 1995) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
119. Id.
120. Hayett v. Kemper Sec., Inc., No. 96-2424, 1997 WL 768921, at *2, 216 Wis. 2d 113,
573 N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1997) (unpublished table decision).
121. Tri-Cnty. Invs., LLC v. Toney Law Offices, S.C., No. 2007AP195, 2008 WL 426233,
¶ 27, 2008 WI App 51, 309 Wis. 2d 234, 747 N.W.2d 527 (Feb. 19, 2008) (per curiam,
unpublished table decision).
122. Breen v. Winkel, No. 95-2677, 1996 WL 252962, at *4, 202 Wis. 2d 651, 551 N.W.2d
64 (Ct. App. May 14, 1996) (unpublished table decision).
123. Id.
124. Navarro v. Lake Grp., Inc., No. 91-1142, 1992 WL 70490, at *1, 167 Wis. 2d 487,
482 N.W.2d 669 (Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1992) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
125. Lake States, Inc. v. Walia, No. 99-1033, 2000 WL 1114485, ¶¶ 7–8, 2000 WI App
214, 238 Wis. 2d 841, 618 N.W.2d 273 (Aug. 1, 2000) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
126. Richco Structures v. Parkside Vill., Inc., No. 82-1069, 1983 WL 161650, at *2, 113
Wis. 2d 722, 334 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. Apr. 22, 1983) (per curiam, unpublished table
decision).
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interests. Where a court ruled that an arbitrator did not commit
misconduct by failing to grant an adjournment, the court identified
various factors that must be considered by the arbitrator, including any
“previous request for . . . [adjournment], how long the . . . [arbitration]
ha[s] been pending, . . . the reasons for the requested continuance,” and
whether any of the parties will be prejudiced.127 In a similar situation,
no misconduct was found when an arbitrator refused to stay a hearing in
order to await the outcome of an underlying lawsuit or to allow a
witness from out of state to return and testify.128 Essentially, the court
will support the arbitrator’s decision provided the arbitrator exercises
reasonable discretion.129
Although generally prohibited, even ex parte contact between the
arbitrator and a party has been held not to be misconduct.130 Finally, the
failure of an arbitrator to swear in a witness has been held not to be a
sufficient basis to vacate an award.131
VII.ARBITRATOR MISUSE OF POWER
An arbitration award will be vacated when the arbitrator exceeds his
powers or so imperfectly executes his powers that a mutual, final, and
definite award has not been made.132 When an arbitrator misuses his
powers, the courts characterize the arbitrator’s conduct as exceeding his
authority.133 There are three different ways that an arbitrator can
misuse his powers or exceed his authority. First, the arbitrator can
construe the parties’ agreement in such a perverse way that he commits
a perverse misconstruction.134 Second, the arbitrator misuses his
127. Tri-Cnty. Invs., LLC v. Toney Law Offices, S.C., No. 2007AP195, 2008 WL 426233,
¶ 22, 2008 WI App 51, 309 Wis. 2d 234, 747 N.W.2d 527 (Feb. 19, 2008) (per curiam,
unpublished table decision) (quoting Brief of Defendant-Appellant Toney Law Offices, S.C.
at 25, Tri-Cnty. Invs., LLC v. Toney Law Offices, S.C., No. 2007AP195 (Feb. 19, 2008), 2007
WL 7259693).
128. Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, LLP v. Bosben, No. 2011AP1862, 2013 WL
627247, ¶ 11, 2013 WI App 41, 346 Wis. 2d 730, 828 N.W.2d 592 (Feb. 21, 2013) (per curiam,
unpublished table decision).
129. Id.
130. Navarro v. Lake Grp., Inc., No. 91-1142, 1992 WL 70490, at *3, 167 Wis. 2d 487,
482 N.W.2d 669 (Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1992) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
131. Mattson v. Schultz, No. 95-2837, 1996 WL 208192, at *2, 201 Wis. 2d 817, 549
N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1996) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
132. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012); WIS. STAT. § 788.10(1)(d) (2013–2014).
133. Racine Cnty. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Dist. 10, 2008 WI
70, ¶ 11, 310 Wis. 2d 508, 751 N.W.2d 312.
134. Id.
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authority when he manifestly disregards the law in arriving at his
award.135 And third, if the arbitrator’s award violates public policy, the
arbitrator has misused his power.136 Any allegation of misuse of power
must be raised before the arbitrator or the issue will be waived.137 It is a
question of law whether an arbitrator has misused his power.138
The public policy limitation on the authority of an arbitrator is not
enumerated in the statute.139 Nevertheless, courts have concluded that
an arbitrator’s award must be consistent with public policy in order to be
sustained.140 Those courts that have supported the public policy
limitation have done so on the basis that the arbitrator’s award must
satisfy the standards set by statute and also those developed at common
law.141
A. Perverse Misconstruction
An arbitrator commits a “perverse misconstruction” of a contract
when the arbitrator’s interpretation is so implausible that it is totally and
absolutely not supported by the contract language or contract
construction principles, and devoid of any foundation in reason.142
When the court is reviewing an arbitrator’s award, the court is not to
decide which construction of the contract is the more reasonable one.143
Rather, the arbitrator’s award must “be upheld if there is some
reasonable foundation” for the award.144 If the court does not find a
135. Id.
136. Id.; Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., No. 2011 WI App 14, ¶ 8, 331
Wis. 2d 188, 795 N.W.2d 777.
137. Fett v. Luksetich, No. 96-0839, 1997 WL 199942, at *4, 210 Wis. 2d 497, 568 N.W.2d
321 (Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1997) (unpublished table decision).
138. Wausaukee Sch. Dist. v. Wausaukee Educ. Ass’n, No. 2011AP1716, 2012 WL
1623504, ¶ 15, 342 Wis. 2d 251, 816 N.W.2d 351 (Ct. App. May 10, 2012) (unpublished table
decision); Milwaukee Police Supervisors’ Org. v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI App 59, ¶ 20,
341 Wis. 2d 361, 815 N.W.2d 391.
139. See WIS. STAT. § 788.10(d) (2013–2014).
140. Racine Cnty., 2008 WI 70, ¶ 11.
141. Fett, 1997 WL 199942, at *3; Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd’s London, 202 Wis. 2d 673, 689, 552 N.W.2d 420, 426 (Ct. App. 1996).
142. Wausaukee Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 1623504, ¶ 24; City of Antigo v. Antigo City
Emps.’ Union Local 1192, No. 89-0296, 1989 WL 112305, at *2, 151 Wis. 2d 786, 447 N.W.2d
395 (Ct. App. July 25, 1989) (unpublished table decision).
143. Baldwin–Woodville Area Sch. Dist. v. W. Cent. Educ. Ass’n—Baldwin Woodville
Unit, 2009 WI 51, ¶ 22, 317 Wis. 2d 691, 766 N.W.2d 591.
144. Milwaukee Police Supervisors’ Org. v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI App 59, ¶ 20,
341 Wis. 2d 361, 815 N.W.2d 391 (quoting Baldwin–Woodville, 2009 WI 51, ¶ 22) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
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reasonable foundation, then the courts conclude that the arbitrator has
exceeded his authority.145 The rationale used by the courts when they
vacate an arbitrator’s award on the basis of a perverse misconstruction is
that the court is protecting the parties’ contract.146
It is proper for an arbitrator to interpret the parties’ contract but not
to modify it.147 An arbitrator is “without authority to . . . modify plain
and unambiguous” terms of the parties’ contract.148 Unfortunately,
there is no bright-line test for distinguishing between interpreting a
contract and modifying it.149 Interpreting an ambiguous contract or term
is within an arbitrator’s authority.150 An arbitrator interprets a contract
when there is ambiguity in the contract. The test used by the courts to
evaluate the arbitrator’s decision that the parties’ contract was
ambiguous is whether the language in question could rationally be
viewed as ambiguous.151 Once it is determined that the contract
language is ambiguous, the arbitrator is free to choose between the
reasonable alternative constructions of the language and thereby does
not commit a perverse misconstruction.152 The court will uphold the
arbitrator’s decision as long as the court finds support for the
arbitrator’s award in the contract, notwithstanding that the court might
have reached a different result.153 Where the parties’ contract provided
for the award of “consequential damages,” the arbitrator’s decision on
145. Baldwin–Woodville, 2009 WI 51, ¶ 23; Milwaukee Police Supervisors’ Org., 2012
WI App 59, ¶ 20.
146. Baldwin–Woodville, 2009 WI 51, ¶ 39 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
147. Wis. Law Enforcement Ass’n, Local 1 v. State Dep’t of Transp., 2010 WI App 27,
¶ 18, 323 Wis. 2d 444, 780 N.W.2d 170.
148. Fluor Bros. Constr. Co. v. City of De Pere, No. 84-466, 1984 WL 180247, at *1, 121
Wis. 2d 698, 359 N.W.2d 181 (Ct. App. Oct. 9, 1984) (unpublished table decision).
149. City of Antigo v. Antigo City Emps.’ Union Local 1192, No. 89-0296, 1989 WL
112305, at *3, 151 Wis. 2d 786, 447 N.W.2d 395 (Ct. App. July 25, 1989) (unpublished table
decision).
150. Id.
151. Local 236 Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am. v. City of Madison, No. 01-1506, 2002
WL 576397, ¶ 25, 2002 WI App 134, 255 Wis. 2d 832, 646 N.W.2d 854 (Apr. 18, 2002)
(unpublished table decision); Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., No. 94-1256,
1995 WL 128497, at *3, 192 Wis. 2d 763, 532 N.W.2d 469 (Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1995) (per
curiam, unpublished table decision).
152. Fluor Bros. Constr. Co., 1984 WL 180247, at *2.
153. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. City of Milwaukee, No. 99-2069, 2000 WL 705353,
¶ 8, 200 WI App 161, 238 Wis. 2d 94, 617 N.W.2d 677 (June 1, 2000) (unpublished table
decision); Oshkosh Paraprofessional Educ. Ass’n v. Oshkosh Area Sch. Dist., No. 95-0133,
1995 WL 702403, at *3, 198 Wis. 2d 388, 542 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1995) (per
curiam, unpublished table decision).

2015]

VACATING ARBITRATION AWARDS

1651

what damages naturally and directly flowed from the breach were
beyond the court’s review.154 Where an arbitrator found the language
“full duties and responsibilities” to be ambiguous and thereby
interpreted the phrase, the court upheld the arbitrator’s interpretation
as one that had a foundation in reason.155 Also, where a contract was
silent on whether “arbitration” meant the arbitrator should conduct a de
novo hearing or a certiorari-type hearing, the arbitrator’s decision that
the language intended a de novo hearing was upheld.156 Finally, where a
contract provided that a party was entitled to “basic due process,” the
arbitrator’s interpretation of such phrase was within the arbitrator’s
purview and “not a perverse misconstruction of the contract.”157
A common tool used by arbitrators when interpreting ambiguous
contract language is to analyze the parties’ past practices. This
technique is consistent with contract analysis, which provides that the
parties’ prior course of dealing158 or course of performance159 or both are
part of their current contract.160 The prior course of dealing and course
of performance are the parties’ past practices. These past practices must
be unequivocal, readily ascertainable, and clearly established between
the parties.161
Where a contract is ambiguous or silent on an issue, an “arbitrator
does not alter or modify [the] contract by drawing upon the past

154. Ackerman v. Mason Bldg. Sys., Inc., No. 92-2608, 1993 WL 404316, at *2–3, 179
Wis. 2d 850, 514 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1993) (per curiam, unpublished table
decision).
155. Local 236 Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., 2002 WL 576397, ¶¶ 13–15.
156. Fortney v. Sch. Dist. of W. Salem, No. 80-1447, 1981 WL 139207, at *5, 104 Wis. 2d
737, 313 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1981) (unpublished table decision).
157. Racine Unified Sch. Dist. v. Serv. Emps.’ Int’l Union, Local 152, 158 Wis. 2d 51, 58,
462 N.W.2d 214, 216 (Ct. App. 1990).
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223(1) (1979) (“A course of dealing is
a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to an agreement which is fairly to be
regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions
and other conduct.”); see also WIS. STAT. §§ 401.205(1), .303(2) (2013–2014).
159. A course of performance is a sequence of conduct concerning the current contract
between the parties that can be useful in interpreting the parties’ contract. See WIS. STAT.
§ 401.303(1).
160. See id. § 401.201(2)(b); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. a
(1979).
161. Cf. City of Antigo v. Antigo City Emps.’ Union Local 1192, No. 89-0296, 1989 WL
112305, at *3, 151 Wis. 2d 786, 447 N.W.2d 395 (Ct. App. July 25, 1989) (unpublished table
decision).
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practice[s]” between the parties to resolve the dispute.162 However, it is
critical that the arbitrator determines and finds in his award that the past
practice has continued under the current contract.163 The failure of the
arbitrator to make such a finding will cause the court to vacate the
arbitrator’s award because it “does not draw its essence” from the
contract.164 For example, in City of Madison v. AFSCME,165 the city
ordered several city employees not to report for duty on a holiday.166
The union objected to the city’s order on the basis that the parties had a
past practice that permitted employees to request not to work on a
holiday.167 When the matter was submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator
found that this practice was well established and the city had made no
effort to seek to change it during contract negotiations.168 Therefore,
the past practice had become part of the parties’ contractual relationship
even though the matter was not expressly in the contract. Proof of a
past practice necessarily avoids a claim of perverse misconstruction.
Two of the more common issues facing an arbitrator that are
challenged as a perverse misconstruction are the award of attorney’s
fees and punitive damages. Wisconsin follows the American rule when
it comes to the award of attorney’s fees to a successful party.169 The
American rule provides that attorney’s fees must be authorized by the
parties’ contract or by a statute.170 Further, if the authorization is to
come from a statute, the statutory authority must be express, not
implied.171 Where an arbitrator awarded attorney’s fees to a successful
party and neither the contract nor any statute expressly provided for

162. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., No. 94-1256, 1995 WL 128497,
at *3, 192 Wis. 2d 763, 532 N.W.2d 469 (Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1995) (per curiam, unpublished
table decision) (citing City of Madison v. AFSCME, 124 Wis. 2d 298, 303, 369 N.W.2d 759,
762 (Ct. App. 1985)); Wis. Law Enforcement Ass’n, Local 1 v. State Dep’t of Transp., 2010
WI App 27, ¶ 19, 323 Wis. 2d 444, 780 N.W.2d 170.
163. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. City of Milwaukee, No. 83-704, 1984 WL 180625,
at *1, 118 Wis. 2d 824, 349 N.W.2d 110 (Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1984) (per curiam, unpublished
table decision).
164. Id. at *2.
165. 124 Wis. 2d 298, 369 N.W.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1985).
166. Id. at 300.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Milwaukee Teacher’s Educ. Ass’n v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 147 Wis. 2d 791,
796–97, 433 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Ct. App. 1988).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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such authority, the arbitrator exceeded his authority.172 On the other
hand, where the parties’ contract provided that the arbitration was to be
conducted under the rules of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), whose rules permitted the award of attorney’s fees if authorized
by law, and a state statute authorized attorney’s fees for the issue in
arbitration, the arbitrator’s award of fees was upheld.173 The court
further noted that, even though the statute provided that a “court”
could award attorney’s fees, the arbitrator’s award of attorney’s fees was
upheld.174 Further, the same rule applies for the award of attorney’s fees
when seeking to confirm an arbitrator’s award with the circuit court or
on appeal from a circuit court decision.175 The parties’ contract or a
statute must authorize the award of such attorney’s fees under those
specific circumstances.176
It is an open question in Wisconsin whether an arbitrator can award
punitive damages. There are three views taken by courts regarding
whether an arbitrator can award punitive damages. The first view,
supported by the federal courts under the FAA, is that arbitrators are
empowered to award punitive damages unless the arbitration agreement
states to the contrary.177 The rationale underlying this view is that the
ability to award punitive damages is needed to provide the arbitrator
with the ability to award complete relief as mandated by the facts.178 In
other words, if the facts are such that a court could award punitive
damages, then an arbitrator should have the same ability.179 The second
view is that the award of punitive damages is solely a function of the
court, and arbitrators do not have the power to award punitive damages,
even if the parties’ agreement would allow them.180 The rationale
supporting the second view is that “arbitration arises out of a
contractual relationship,” and parties are unable by contract to benefit

172. Id. at 797–98.
173. Winkelman v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 2005 WI App 25, ¶ 17, 279 Wis. 2d 335, 693
N.W.2d 756.
174. Id.
175. Id. ¶ 45.
176. Id. ¶ 17.
177. Raytheon Co. v. Automated Bus. Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1989); see also
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995).
178. Raytheon Co., 882 F.2d at 12.
179. Id.
180. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983).
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from or be penalized by the award of punitive damages.181 The third
view provides that punitive damages may be awarded by an arbitrator
but only when there is an express provision authorizing such relief in the
arbitration agreement.182 The rationale supporting this view is that
punitive damages are relatively rare in contract disputes and, as such,
such a drastic remedy should not be implied without express
authorization in the contract.183
The leading case in Wisconsin on the ability of an arbitrator to
award punitive damages is Winkelman v. Kraft Foods, Inc.184
Winkleman was a farmer who was awarded punitive damages by an
arbitrator as a result of fraudulent statements made by an agent of Kraft
Foods.185 When Winkleman submitted the arbitrator’s award to the
circuit court for confirmation, the circuit court affirmed the arbitrator’s
award of compensatory damages but denied the punitive damage
award.186 Winkleman appealed the circuit court’s denial of the punitive
damage award.187
The appeals court acknowledged the three
approaches taken by various jurisdictions on this issue.188 However, the
court declined to choose between the three views.189 Rather, the court
concluded that it was the arbitrator’s decision to choose which view of
the parties’ contract the arbitrator would accept, and having done so by
selecting the first view, the court would not vacate the arbitrator’s award
of punitive damages.190 Therefore, in the absence of a statutory or
judicial declaration on the matter, an arbitrator is free to choose
between the three views when deciding whether to award punitive
damages.
The first view does appear to be the better reasoned one. Where a
factual circumstance is such that an award of punitive damages is
justified, it should not matter whether the tribunal is a court or
arbitration. If such were the case, a party could use arbitration as a
means to escape full responsibility for his fraudulent or underhanded
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Complete Interiors, Inc. v. Behan, 558 So. 2d 48, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
Id.
2005 WI App 25, 279 Wis. 2d 335, 693 N.W.2d 756.
Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 24.
Id. ¶ 25.
Id.
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conduct. The second view suggests that the parties are unable to
contract for the provision of punitive damages. In the absence of some
recognized defense to contract formation, such as unconscionability,
duress, or the like, there seems to be no legal or logical basis for denying
parties the right to enter into any contract they choose, including one
that provides for the potential of punitive damages. Finally, the third
view suggests that because punitive damages are rare in a contract
dispute, punitive damages need to be expressly authorized. However,
simply because something only rarely happens does not mean, nor
should it mean, that when it does happen, a court or tribunal is not able
to address fully the matter. Otherwise, arbitration is not a full and fair
substitute for litigation.
B. Manifest Disregard of the Law
A court may not overturn an arbitration award simply because an
arbitrator makes an error of law.191 Rather, the arbitrator’s award must
show “a manifest disregard of the law.”192 There are two ways that an
arbitrator’s award can be vacated on the ground that it is in manifest
disregard of the law. First, an arbitrator commits a manifest disregard
for the law when the arbitrator makes “no attempt to apply or [even]
interpret the relevant . . . law.”193 Second, an award will be vacated on
the basis that it is in manifest disregard for the law when the award
“conflict[s] with [the] governing law, as set forth in the constitution, a
statute, or case law.”194
An illustration of an arbitrator committing a manifest disregard of
the law is Orlowski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.195
In Orlowski, an insured submitted a claim under her uninsured motorist
191. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2011 WI App 14, ¶ 8, 331 Wis. 2d
188, 795 N.W.2d 777.
192. Id. (quoting City of Madison v. Madison Prof’l Police Officers Ass’n, 144 Wis. 2d
576, 586, 425 N.W.2d 8, 11 (1988)).
193. Racine Cnty. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Dist. 10, 2008 WI
70, ¶ 33, 310 Wis. 2d 508, 751 N.W.2d 312; Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 2011 WI App 14, ¶ 8;
Breen v. Winkel, No. 95-2677, 1996 WL 252962, at *3, 202 Wis. 2d 651, 551 N.W.2d 64 (Ct.
App. May 14, 1996) (unpublished table decision); Lukowski v. Dankert, 178 Wis. 2d 110, 115,
503 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Ct. App. 1993); City of Madison v. Local 311, 133 Wis. 2d 186, 191, 394
N.W.2d 766, 769 (Ct. App. 1986).
194. Racine Cnty., 2008 WI 70, ¶ 34; see Baldwin–Woodville Area Sch. Dist. v. W. Cent.
Educ. Ass’n—Baldwin Woodville Unit, 2009 WI 51, ¶ 24, 317 Wis. 2d 691, 766 N.W.2d 591;
Sharp v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 81-1648, 1982 WL 172066, at *2, 107 Wis. 2d
747, 322 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. May 17, 1982) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
195. 2012 WI 21, 339 Wis. 2d 1, 810 N.W.2d 775.
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coverage after exhausting the policy limits against an underinsured
motorist.196 The claim was submitted to an arbitration panel, and the
panel “precluded Orlowski from recovering . . . the value of medical
expenses that were written off by her medical provider.”197 The basis of
the arbitrators’ ruling was that the collateral source rule did not apply to
uninsured motorist cases.198 The collateral source rule “provides that ‘a
plaintiff’s recovery cannot be reduced by payments or benefits from
other sources.’”199 The policies underlying the collateral source rule are
that the tortfeasor should pay the full cost of his wrongful conduct, the
aggrieved party should be fully compensated, and the insured should
receive the full benefit of the premiums paid.200 The court concluded
that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law by not applying the
collateral source rule to Orlowski’s recovery.201
By comparison, in Pegues v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co.,202
an insured was involved in an accident and claimed that another vehicle
hit his car from behind and pushed his vehicle into the accident.203 The
insured’s claim that a third vehicle was involved in the accident caused
the insurance company to seek to preserve the insured’s vehicle for a
subsequent inspection to determine if the insured’s vehicle was damaged
in the rear.204 Unfortunately, the insurance company erroneously
released the insured’s vehicle from custody before any inspection, and it
was subsequently repaired.205 The arbitration panel subsequently ruled
against the insured on his claim that his vehicle was damaged from the
rear.206 On appeal to the circuit court, the insured argued that the
arbitration panel committed a manifest disregard of the law because it
failed to apply the presumption of spoilage law that any damaged or
destroyed evidence would have yielded evidence detrimental to the one

196. Id. ¶ 2.
197. Id.
198. Id. ¶ 3.
199. Id. ¶ 18 (quoting Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ¶ 29, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 620
N.W.2d 201).
200. Id.
201. Id. ¶ 40.
202. Pegues v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 2008AP1500, 2009 WL 454672, 2009 WI App
41, 316 Wis. 2d 774, 766 N.W.2d 242 (Feb. 25, 2009) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
203. Id. ¶ 2.
204. Id. ¶ 4.
205. Id.
206. Id. ¶ 5.

2015]

VACATING ARBITRATION AWARDS

1657

who damaged or destroyed the evidence (the insurance company).207
The court, however, noted that the presumption arising from spoilage
only occurs when the evidence is deliberately or intentionally destroyed
or damaged.208 The court upheld the panel’s decision because the
evidence was destroyed as a result of the insurance company’s
negligence, not any egregious conduct.209 Therefore, there was no
manifest disregard of the law by the panel.
Occasionally, an arbitrator will be faced with conflicting legal
precedent. Where there are conflicting positions or unsettled law, the
arbitrator does not commit a manifest disregard of the law by choosing
to follow one of the contrary positions.210 There is no manifest disregard
of the law where “substantial authority sustains the arbitrator’s
assumption as to the law.”211 This is true whether the court agrees with
the arbitrator’s assumption or not.212 Where the courts were split on
whether Wisconsin Statutes section 100.18 could be applied to a
commercial contract dispute (as opposed to a consumer dispute), the
arbitrator was free to choose either position without committing a
manifest disregard of the law.213 Similarly, where an arbitrator awarded
emotional distress damages for a non-traumatic economic injury, the
award was upheld against a claim that the damage award was a manifest
disregard of the law because the courts were split on the issue.214
Sometimes, there is simply no established law for the arbitrator to
evaluate. In Lukowski v. Dankert,215 the injured party was involved in a
traffic accident and was thrown from the vehicle.216 The aggrieved party
was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the injury.217 The matter was

207. Id. ¶ 9.
208. Id. ¶ 10.
209. Id. ¶ 12.
210. Winkelman v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 2005 WI App 25, ¶¶ 12–13, 279 Wis. 2d 335, 693
N.W.2d 756.
211. City of Madison v. Local 311, 133 Wis. 2d 186, 191, 394 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Ct. App.
1986); see Grambow v. Associated Dental Servs., Inc., No. 94-1735, 1996 WL 5638, at *4, 199
Wis. 2d 522, 546 N.W.2d 578 (Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1996) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
212. Local 311, 133 Wis. 2d at 191.
213. Id.
214. Breen v. Winkel, No. 95-2677, 1996 WL 252962, at *3, 202 Wis. 2d 651, 551 N.W.2d
64 (Ct. App. May 14, 1996) (unpublished table decision).
215. 184 Wis. 2d 142, 515 N.W.2d 883 (1994).
216. Id. at 146.
217. Id.
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referred to an arbitration panel for resolution.218 No expert testimony
was provided with regard to the injured party’s comparative negligence
as a result of not wearing a seatbelt.219 Nevertheless, the panel by a vote
of 2–1 allocated forty percent negligence to the injured party because
she was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the accident.220 The
dissenting arbitrator argued that expert testimony was required before
any comparative negligence could be allocated to the injured party.221
Therefore, in the absence of such testimony, no comparative negligence
should have been allocated to the injured party. Upon submission of
the panel’s decision to the court for confirmation, the trial court agreed
with the dissenting arbitrator and concluded that the panel’s award was
a manifest disregard of the law.222 The generally accepted law in
Wisconsin is that expert testimony is required to allocate comparative
negligence for the failure to wear a seat belt.223 However, all the cases
that have applied the general rule were cases where the injured person
was injured inside the vehicle.224 On appeal, the appeals court noted
that the arbitration panel did discuss the generally accepted rule that
requires expert testimony to allocate comparative negligence for failure
to wear a seat belt.225 But the appeals court concluded that those cases
were not applicable because the injured party in this matter was ejected
from the vehicle.226 The appeals court did not find that the arbitration
panel committed any manifest disregard of the law.227 Rather, the
appeals court concluded that the panel distinguished the current case
from the existing case law and, thereby, was free to fill in the gap in the
existing law.228 The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed because the
panel considered the relevant law and the distinction made by the panel
was not precluded by any case law or statute.229 Similarly, where there
were no generally accepted accounting principles applicable to valuing
certain financial assets, the arbitrators did not commit a manifest
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
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disregard of the law where they “were guided by their professional
experience and the . . . underlying principles” to the contract in
rendering an award.230
C. Against Public Policy
An award that violates a strong public policy will be vacated,231 if the
public policy is clearly defined.232
The public policy exception to the general rule of judicial
deference [is] . . . narrowly construed and limited to situations
where the public policy “is well defined and dominant . . . .
[Public policy] is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and
legal precedents and not from general considerations of
supposed public interests.”233
In other words, public policy is not to be found in the mind of the
beholder.
There are a number of cases that illustrate when public policy is
clearly defined. In Sands v. Menard, Inc.,234 Menard, Inc. had hired Ms.
Sands as their general counsel.235 Thereafter, Menard terminated Sands,
and Sands sued Menard for wrongful termination.236 The parties agreed
to submit the matter to arbitration.237 At the conclusion of the
arbitration hearing, “the panel ordered that Sands be reinstated” to her
general counsel position.238 Menard refused reinstatement, and Ms.
Sands sought to compel compliance by confirming the arbitration award
with the circuit court.239 Conversely, Menard sought to vacate the award
on the basis that the award was against public policy because the

230. Grambow v. Associated Dental Servs., Inc., No. 94-1735, 1996 WL 5638, at *3, 199
Wis. 2d 522, 546 N.W.2d 578 (Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1996) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
231. Sands v. Menard, Inc., 2010 WI 96, ¶¶ 2, 50, 328 Wis. 2d 647, 787 N.W.2d 384;
Fortney v. Sch. Dist. of W. Salem, No. 80-1447, 1981 WL 139207, at *5, 104 Wis. 2d 737, 313
N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1981) (unpublished table decision).
232. Breen v. Winkel, No. 95-2677, 1996 WL 252962, at *2, 202 Wis. 2d 651, 551 N.W.2d
64 (Ct. App. May 14, 1996) (unpublished table decision).
233. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2011 WI App 14, ¶ 14, 331 Wis.
2d 188, 795 N.W.2d 777 (quoting Sands, 2010 WI 96, ¶ 50).
234. 2010 WI 96.
235. Id. ¶ 4.
236. Id. ¶ 1.
237. Id. ¶ 20.
238. Id. ¶ 26.
239. Id. ¶ 29.
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attorney–client relationship was irretrievably broken.240 The circuit
court “confirmed the arbitration award in its entirety.”241 On further
appeal, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court vacated the arbitration
award.242 The court noted that a public policy violation must be clear,
and the particular public policy must be well-defined and dominant.243
The court found that “an attorney’s ethical obligations, particularly the
attorney’s duty of loyalty . . . under . . . the Rules of Professional
Conduct, embody the strong public policy of the State of Wisconsin.”244
As such, the court concluded that the arbitration award violated public
policy because it “order[ed] the reinstatement of an attorney where
[the] reinstatement would clearly lead to a violation of the attorney’s
ethical obligations.”245 In the court’s opinion, the arbitrators’ award
would “force[] an attorney to represent a client” where there has been a
“complete disintegration of mutual goodwill, trust, and loyalty” between
the parties.246
Another illustration of clearly defined public policy is Kadlec v.
Kadlec.247 In Kadlec, a father and son were business partners “in a
number of business ventures.”248 One of the businesses was “a
community based residential facility in Iowa.”249 Subsequently, the
parties decided to dissolve their business relationships.250 As part of the
dissolution process, the parties agreed to submit any matters that they
could not amicably resolve to arbitration.251 As part of the dissolution
process, the father “signed an exclusive listing contract with a Wisconsin
real estate broker . . . to sell” the community-based residential facility in
Iowa.252 Thereafter, the property was sold in Iowa, and the father paid
his one-half of the real estate commission to the Wisconsin relator, but
the son refused to pay.253 In order to force the son to pay his one-half of
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
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the real estate commission, the father sought an order from an arbitrator
ordering the son to pay.254 The arbitrator issued an award ordering the
son to pay his share of the commission, and the circuit court affirmed
the order.255 The court of appeals, however, vacated the arbitrator’s
award.256 The court noted that both Wisconsin and Iowa have specific
statutes requiring a realtor to have a license in its state before a
commission can be paid for real estate services in that state.257 More
particularly, those statutes require that a real estate broker prove he is
licensed in the particular state where the services are rendered.258 The
public policy underlying the licensing requirements is to establish
competency in each state as each state defines it.259 The arbitrator’s
award essentially required the son to pay a real estate commission to a
Wisconsin realtor for the sale of property in Iowa.260 As such, the
arbitrator’s award violated the strong public policy emanating from each
state’s licensing laws, therefore requiring that the arbitrator’s award be
vacated.261
Conversely, where the public policy is not clearly defined, the courts
will defer to the arbitrator’s judgment and not vacate the arbitrator’s
award on a supposed public policy basis. In City of Madison v.
AFSCME,262 the city ordered several city employees not to report for
duty on a holiday.263 The union objected to the city’s order on the basis
that the parties had a past practice that permitted employees to decide if
they wished to work on a holiday.264 When the matter was submitted to
arbitration, the arbitrator ruled that the past practice between the
parties was part of their contractual arrangement and the city had
violated the parties’ agreement.265 The city petitioned the circuit court
to vacate the award on the ground that it violated the public policy that
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at ¶ 14.
257. Id. ¶ 9; see also WIS. STAT. § 452.20 (2013–2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 543B.30
(West 2011).
258. Kadlec, 2004 WI App 84, ¶ 9; see also WIS. STAT. § 452.20; IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 543B.30.
259. Kadlec, 2004 WI App 84, ¶ 12.
260. Id. ¶ 13.
261. Id. ¶ 14.
262. 124 Wis. 2d 298, 369 N.W.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1985).
263. Id. at 300.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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a city has complete control of its fiscal policies.266 The circuit court
vacated the arbitrator’s award on the basis of that public policy.267 The
appeals court, however, reversed the circuit court and reinstated the
arbitrator’s award.268 The appeals court noted that “[c]ourts should
proceed cautiously when making public policy determinations.”269 As
such, the court reasoned that, “in the absence of evidence as to the
exigency of the city’s financial condition,” it was reluctant to overturn
the arbitrator’s award on the basis of public policy.270
The courts will give the arbitrator significant latitude in specifying a
particular remedy, provided the arbitrator acknowledges the public
policy applicable to the situation. The courts note that an arbitrator is
free to be innovative in directing a particular remedy, provided the
remedy is consistent with the parties’ agreement and public policy.271
Even where the arbitrator’s awards are significantly different on
essentially the same factual pattern, the courts have upheld the awards
provided the arbitrators acknowledged the public policy involved in the
circumstance. For example, in Cedarburg Education Association v.
Cedarburg Board of Education,272 a public school teacher had viewed
“adult images” on the school’s computer system in violation of the
school’s computer policy.273 As a result, the school district terminated
the teacher’s employment.274 The union objected to the termination on
the basis that the discharge was not for just cause.275 The parties agreed
to submit the matter to binding arbitration.276 The arbitrator concluded
that the single violation by the teacher did not warrant termination and
ordered the teacher’s reinstatement.277 The school board refused to

266. Id. at 300–01.
267. Id. at 301.
268. Id. at 306.
269. Id. at 305 (quoting Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 573, 335
N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. Id. at 305–06.
271. Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, No. 84-1681, 1985 Wisc.
App. LEXIS 3799, at *9, 127 Wis. 2d 561, 378 N.W.2d 296 (Oct. 10, 1985) (unpublished table
decision).
272. No. 2007AP852, 2008 WL 2812714, 2008 WI App 135, 313 Wis. 2d 831, 756 N.W.2d
809 (Wis. Ct. App. July 23, 2008) (unpublished table decision).
273. Id. ¶ 3.
274. Id. ¶ 1.
275. Id.
276. Id. ¶ 2.
277. Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
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reinstate the teacher, and the union filed a complaint in circuit court to
enforce the arbitration award.278
The circuit court vacated the
arbitrator’s award on the basis that the teacher’s immoral conduct was
an automatic ground for termination.279 On appeal, the appeals court
agreed that a court may vacate an arbitrator’s award when it violates a
strong public policy.280 Further, the appeals court acknowledged that
Wisconsin has a statutory definition of immoral conduct for the
protection of students, which is evidence of a strong public policy.281
Therefore, the appeals court vacated the arbitrator’s award on the basis
that it violated the strong public policy against immoral conduct in
schools and affirmed the circuit court’s order terminating the teacher’s
employment.282
Conversely, in Middleton Education Association v. Middleton–Cross
Plains Area School District,283 a number of teachers were disciplined for
“viewing and sharing on school computers emails containing sexually
explicit pictures and inappropriate jokes.”284 The school district
terminated one of the teachers and the union challenged the discharge
in arbitration.285 The arbitrator reduced the employee’s termination to a
suspension.286
Thereafter, the union applied to the court for
confirmation of the award, and the school district moved to vacate it.287
The circuit court confirmed the arbitrator’s award.288 On appeal, the
court presumed “a strong public policy against teachers viewing sexually
explicit materials in school or on school-issued computers.”289 The
school district argued that “any discipline short of termination . . . fails
to give sufficient weight to the presumed public policy.”290 The court of

278. Id. ¶ 4.
279. Id.
280. Id. ¶ 10.
281. Id. ¶ 14; see WIS. STAT. § 115.31(1)(c) (2013–2014) (“‘Immoral conduct’ means
conduct or behavior that is contrary to commonly accepted moral or ethical standards and
that endangers the health, safety, welfare or education of any pupil.”).
282. Cedarburg, 2008 WL 2812714, ¶ 21.
283. No. 2012AP2395, 2013 WL 4556288, 2013 WI App 115, 350 Wis. 2d 5057, 838
N.W.2d 137 (Aug. 29, 2013) (per curiam, unpublished table decision).
284. Id. ¶ 1.
285. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
286. Id. ¶ 3.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. ¶ 8.
290. Id. ¶ 10.
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appeals, however, disagreed with the school district.291 The court noted
that the school district’s argument was not supported by any published
case law, nor would it be fair to terminate only one employee without
also terminating others “who also viewed sexually explicit material in
school or on school computers.”292 In other words, there may be a
number of remedies available to an arbitrator as long as the arbitrator
honors the strong public policy.
Finally, even though an employee’s conduct clearly violates public
policy and justifies termination, the employee may be reinstated if the
employer also breached the contract. In Racine Unified School District
v. Service Employees’ International Union, Local 152,293 an employee of
the school district smoked marijuana with a student.294 Upon learning of
the incident, the school suspended the employee and initiated a
disciplinary hearing.295 Upon the conclusion of the disciplinary hearing,
the employee was terminated.296 The hearing officer at the disciplinary
hearing conducted all aspects of the hearing, including “interview[ing]
[the] witnesses, decid[ing] what charges to bring, issu[ing] the charges,
determin[ing] which witnesses were to be called at the hearing,
presid[ing] at the hearing, and ma[king] the decision to terminate” the
employee.297 The union objected to the lack of due process exhibited in
the disciplinary hearing and sought arbitration of the matter.298 “The
arbitrator found that the employee did smoke marijuana with the
student and that . . . [his conduct was] just cause . . . for termination.”299
The arbitrator, however, further found that because the employee was
denied basic due process rights the employee’s penalty was reduced
from termination to a one-year suspension without pay.300 “The district
moved to vacate the arbitration award . . . .”301 The circuit court vacated
the award on the basis that it violated the strong public policy of
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“protecting students from drug use in the schools.”302 On appeal,
however, the court reversed the circuit court’s decision and reinstated
the arbitrator’s award.303 The court reasoned that the arbitrator’s order
reinstating the employee after a one-year suspension without pay was
justified in order to remedy the school district’s breach of its obligation
to provide basic due process rights during the disciplinary process.304
VIII.CONCLUSION
Once an arbitration award has been issued, the prevailing party
normally seeks to have the award confirmed by a court. At the same
time, the disappointed party has the right to move the court to vacate
the award. There are five grounds recognized by the courts for vacating
an arbitrator’s award.
First, the moving party can raise substantive arbitrability. There are
two different types of substantive arbitrability. One is to prove that the
parties never entered into a contract to arbitrate their dispute or that the
contract they did enter into is avoidable for any of the usual contract
defenses. Two, the disappointed party can challenge the scope of the
arbitration clause upon which the other party maintains that their
dispute must be arbitrated.
The second ground is to establish that the prevailing party used
some corruption, fraud, or undue means to corrupt the arbitration
process. In addition to proving the improper conduct by the other party,
it must also be established that there is a nexus between the improper
conduct and the award and that the improper conduct was not
discoverable prior to the award.
Third, an award will be vacated where it can be shown that the
arbitrator was evidently partial. The third ground primarily focuses on
what is required to be disclosed by the arbitrator prior to being
approved as the arbitrator. It is much preferred to have issues of
impartiality resolved by the parties before the arbitration, rather than by
a court after the arbitration. In addition, if a disclosure is made prior to
the arbitration, it can no longer be used as a basis for vacatur after the
arbitration.
Fourth, arbitrator misconduct in conducting the arbitration is a
ground for vacatur. There are a multitude of issues that arise here,
302. Id.
303. Id. at 62–63.
304. Id.
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including the arbitrator’s failure to record the hearing, denying
adjournment requests, failing to admit evidence, failing to provide a
reasoned award, and others. These are difficult issues where the
arbitrator must balance competing interests, and the failure to exercise
appropriate discretion will result in a vacatur.
Finally, the last ground is where the arbitrator has exceeded his
authority by misusing his power. There are three ways that an arbitrator
exceeds his authority. First, the arbitrator can commit a perverse
misconstruction of the parties’ contract. In other words, an arbitrator
can interpret the parties’ contract, but he cannot amend, modify, or add
to it. Although there are many issues that arise under the “perverse
misconstruction” argument, two of the most common ones are the
ability of an arbitrator to award attorney’s fees and punitive damages.
Second, an arbitrator exceeds his authority when he manifestly
disregards the law. This occurs when the arbitrator’s award either
ignores the law or conflicts with prevailing law. An arbitrator, however,
is free to choose between conflicting precedents or fill in the gap if there
is no precedent. Finally, the arbitrator cannot issue an award that is
against public policy. The public policy, however, must be clearly
defined by the constitution, a statute, or case law.

